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ABSTRACT 
PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE ASSESSMENT OF INDONESIAN 10-MWT RDE 
EXPERIMENTAL POWER REACTOR USING INPRO METHODOLOGY. Assessment of 
proliferation resistance (PR) for 10-MWt RDE has been conducted to verify the RDE safeguards 
desain. Proliferation resistance (PR) is a parameter that can be used to measure the ability of a 
facility to implement safeguards (safeguardability). Safeguards is every technical measure used to 
ensure that every nuclear material in a facility is used as declared and only for welfare. Proliferation 
resistance of 10-MWt RDE has been assessed with INPRO methodology. The areas assessed 
were specific to intrinsic features of RDE, which consist of the attractiveness of nuclear material 
and technology and also detectability and chances of diversion of the nuclear material. This 
assessment concludes that the 10-MWt RDE has strong proliferation resistance, which indicates 
that the facility has small ability to diverse nuclear material and will less likely be used to proliferate 
nuclear weapon. 
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ABSTRAK 
PENILAIAN KETAHANAN PROLIFERASI REAKTOR DAYA EKSPERIMENTAL (RDE) 10-MWT 
MENGGUNAKAN METODE INPRO. Penilaian ketahanan proliferasi (PR) untuk reaktor RDE  
10 MWt telah dilakukan untuk meverifikasi desain sistem seifgard pada RDE. Ketahanan proliferasi 
merupakan sebuah parameter yang dapat digunakan untuk mengukur kemampuan penerapan 
sistem seifgard (safeguardability) pada suatu fasilitas. Seifgard adalah segala upaya teknis yang 
dilakukan untuk memastikan bahwa bahan nuklir digunakan untuk tujuan damai. Penilaian 
ketahanan proliferasi dilakukan menggunakan metode INPRO. Penilaian ketahanan proliferasi 
dilakukan untuk fitur instrinsik RDe yang meliputi daya tarik bahan nuklir dan teknologi untuk 
proliferasi, kemampuan deteksi kegiatan proliferasi dan kemudahan diversi bahan nuklir. Penilaian 
ketahanan proliferasi menunjukkan bahwa Fasilitas RDE 10-MWt memiliki ketahanan proliferasi 
yang kuat. Hasil tersebut menandakan bahwa fasilitas ini memiliki memiliki kemampuan yang kecil 
untuk digunakan dalam kegeiatan proliferasi bahan nuklir.  
Kata Kunci: Ketahanan Proliferasi, Seifgard, INPRO 
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INTRODUCTION 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT) 
According to Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), 
there are two kinds of states as parties to the 
treaty: Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and 
Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS)[1]. 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
along with state level authority must 
supervise the use of nuclear material in a 
NNWS[1]. NPT serve as prove of 
understanding and commitment of both 
parties to only use nuclear technology for 
peaceful purposes. NPT aims to eliminate the 
threat of nuclear war and the halm of nuclear 
weapon. NPT directs NWS to keep their 
nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon 
technology for themself and NNWS not to 
accept any nuclear weapon or nuclear 
weapon technology. Nuclear facilities have to 
fulfill the NPT requirements before being 
established. The requirement is to prove that 
the state will not use nuclear facility to 
proliferate nuclear material or to use nuclear 
material for harmful purposes. 
RDE Experimental Power Reactor 
Indonesia as a NNWS have been 
developing nuclear technology since 1958 
with the establishment of Lembaga Tenaga 
Atom (Atomic Energy Institue) that changed 
into BATAN (National Nuclear Energy 
Agency). RDE Experimental Power Reactor 
is BATAN’s most recent project to 
demonstrate the feasibility of nuclear power 
in Indonesia. The 10-MWt High Temperature 
Gas Cooled Reactor (HTGR) as an 
experimental power reactor is currently in a 
detailed engineering design phase. The 
safeguards design of the 10-MWt RDE is 
needed for the project to achieve its 
construction permit from the regulatory body 
(BAPETEN). Figure 1 shows the details of a 
pebble fuel used in HTGR[2]. The fuel 
handling system of the RDE separates fresh, 
spent, and damaged fuels. The semi-
automatic system in the RDE decreases 
human contact in refuelling the reactor core. 
The un-abliity to gve unique identification for 
each pebble due to small pebble size (6 cm 
each) make RDE a bulk facility[3]. 
 
Figure 1. Pebble and TRISO fuel details[2]. 
Safeguards and Proliferation Resistance 
Safeguards is every technical 
measure used to ensure the use of nuclear 
material is only for peaceful purposes. Key 
measurement point (KMP) is a place or area 
inside Material Balance Area (MBA) or facility 
such as reactor where nuclear material can 
be precisely accounted[4]. The formation of 
each key measurement point in the 10-MWt 
RDE is showed in Figure 2[3].  
 
Figure 2. Key Measurement Points (KMP) of 
10-MWt RDE; the inventory KMPs 
are noted in letters (A, B, C, D) and 
flow KMPs are noted in numbers (1, 
2, 3, 4)[2]. 
Urania 
Vol. 26 No. 1, Februari 2020: 1-68 
 
 
 
p ISSN 0852−4777; e ISSN 2528−0473 
 
 
 
 
60 
Proliferation Resistance (PR) is a parameter 
that can be used to measure how strong a 
facility is to prevent proliferation to happen. A 
facility or innovative nuclear system (INS) 
with high PR is less likely to or have lower 
ability to proliferate the nuclear material[5]. 
Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures 
simultaneously affect the strength of 
proliferation resistance[6]. Intrinsic features 
of a nuclear reactor in example are design of 
the reactor, also shape and type of nuclear 
material used. Extrinsic measures that 
affected the PR are state’s commitment to the 
NPT, safeguards system established in the 
state or facility, also export control policy of 
nuclear material and technology. PR and 
Safeguards. 
Assessing the proliferation 
resistance of an INS can help in establishing 
an ideal safeguards system within a facility. 
Assessment result of PR can give reference 
and suggestion about which part of the INS 
that needs improvement in order to establish 
the safeguards system. There are various 
method in assessing proliferation resistance, 
one of them is proliferation resistance and 
physical protection assessment by 
Generation IV International Forum, and the 
other method is INPRO from International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) . International 
Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and 
Fuel Cycles (INPRO) is an initiative launched 
by IAEA in the year 2000. INPRO goal is to 
help and ensure the sustainability of nuclear 
energy available in 21st century[7]. INPRO 
gains its goal using sets of basic principles to 
evaluate an INS before being established 
with a purpose to ensure that the INS is 
sustainable in every important area. The 
innovative nuclear system (INS) has to 
achieve basic principles in economic, 
infrastructure, waste management, 
proliferation resistance, physical protection, 
environment, and safety. INPRO 
methodology uses the value of each basic 
principle to evaluate sustainability of the INS. 
INPRO methodology is choosen because it 
have more comprehensive assessment 
parameter compared to other methods. 
INPRO methodology for evaluating 
proliferation resistance has one basic 
principle. The basic principle for proliferation 
resistance is “PR intrinsic features and 
extrinsic measures shall be implemented 
throughout the full life cycle for INS to help 
ensure that INS will continue to be an 
unattractive means to acquire fissile material 
for a nuclear weapon programme. Both 
intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are 
essential, and neither shall be considered 
sufficient by itself”[8]. 
 INPRO methodology has five user 
requirements (UR) to fulfil the PR basic 
principle. The user requirements for 
evaluating PR are (1) state’s commitments, 
obligations and policies regarding non-
proliferation and its implementation should be 
adequate to fulfill international standards in 
the non-proliferation regime; (2) the 
attractiveness of nuclear material and 
technology in an INS for a nuclear weapons 
programme should be low; (3) the diversion 
of nuclear material should be reasonably 
difficult and detectable; (4) INS should 
incorporate multiple PR and measures; (5) 
INS should optimize the combination of 
intrinsic features and extrinsic measures in 
the design/engineering phase to provide 
cost-efficient PR[8].  
Assessment of PR in 10-MWt RDE in 
Indonesia gives broader knowledge on how 
to implement safeguards, by design or not, in 
early stage. The knowledge of safeguards 
implementation can be used in the future if 
Indonesia wants to establish a nuclear power 
plant. Understanding of proliferation 
resistance can deepen safeguards 
implementation and help operator to study 
weaknesses of facility to nuclear material 
proliferation. The weaknesses of facility can 
be an important data for operator and state to 
use safeguards by design before the facility 
is established. 
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METHODS 
 The evaluation that has been 
conducted in this paper was focused on the 
intrinsic features of the 10-MWt RDE. Intrinsic 
features cover UR 2 and UR 3 in the INPRO 
methodology. Evaluation was carrued out by 
comparing points of indicator in each user 
requirement with the data from basic 
engineering design of the 10-MWt RDE 
written in the safeguards system of RDE. 
Table 1 shows the example of UR 2 
evaluation details. Table 1 only serve as an 
example of data that will be discussed.
Table 1. Example from some indicator taken from UR 2 and UR 3 combined [8] 
Indicators No 
Evaluation 
Parameter 
Evaluation Scale 
VW W M S VS 
Material 
Quality 
(UR2) 
1 Material Type UDU IDU LEU NU DU 
2 239Pu/Pu (%wt)  >50  <50  
3 Dose (mGy/hr) at 1m  <150 150–350 350–1000 1000–10000 >10000 
4 238Pu/Pu (%wt)  <20  >20  
Material 
Quantity 
(UR2) 
5 Mass of an item (kg) 10 10–100 100–500 500–1000 >1000 
6 
Mass of bulk 
material for SQ 
10 10–100 100–500 500–1000 >1000 
7 
No. of SQs (material 
stock or flow) 
>100 50–100 10–50 1–10 <1 
Accountability 
(UR3) 
8 σMUF/SQ > 2 2~1 1~0.5 0.5~0.1 < 0.1 
 
User requirement as shown in the 
table above can be evaluated by choosing 
one of the data in evaluation scale according 
to information from the safeguards system. 
The scale is ranged from Very Weak (VW), 
Weak (W), Medium (M), Strong (S), and Very 
Strong (VS). The final score of proliferation 
resistance can then be calculated by the 
mean of every scale evaluated. Evaluation 
parameter that only has weak or strong scale 
such as 239Pu/Pu (%wt) in example above is 
also present in UR 2 and UR 3. The total 
score will be counted with the scale of 1 to 5. 
Very weak resistance will give 1 score while 
very strong resistance will give 5 score. The 
score then will be divided by numbers of 
parameter evaluated. The average score will 
be rounded to the nearest round number to 
indicate the result of each UR from very weak 
to very strong. Evaluation parameter number 
6 and 7 needs to be counted from the data of 
RDE detailed design information [9].  
Evaluation parameter number 6 will be 
counted using Equation 1 and evaluation 
parameter number 7 will be counted using 
Equation 2.
Mass for SQ =
SQ for Uranium
Mass of U in Pebble
 x Mass of Each Pebble                                              (1) 
Number of Item for SQ =
Mass for SQ
Mass of a pebble
                                                                               (2) 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Evaluation of User Requirement 2 
Attractiveness of Nuclear Material and 
Technology 
Evaluation of User Requirement 
(UR) 2 was done using a total of 14 
evaluation parameters. Table 2 shows the 
evaluation result of UR 2. The first indicator is 
material quality with evaluation parameter 
number one is material type. The material type 
is divided based on uranium enrichment and 
use. The Directly Used High Enriched 
Uranium (UDU) have very weak proliferation 
resistance, followed by Indirectly Used High 
Enriched Uranium (IDU) as eak, Low enriched 
Uranium (LEU) as Medium, Natural Uranium 
(NU) in strong, and Depleted Uranium (DU) in 
Very Strong proliferation resistance. The  
10-MWt RDE uses uranium with an initial 
enrichment of 17%[9] which is classified as low 
enriched uranium (LEU). LEU as the material 
type gave this facility a medium score of 
proliferation resistance. Evaluation 
parameters 2 to 6 could not be determined. 
Parameters 2, 5 and 6 about certain plutonium 
isotopes to mean of all the plutonium presents 
could not be determined due to lack of 
neutronic information of the pebble spent fuel. 
Currently there are no data of post irradiation 
examination in pebble fuel or any HTGR fuel. 
Dose rate of the fuel and spent fuel could not 
be evaluated because lack of information in 
dose calculation of the TRISO fuel. Another 
parameter which could not be evaluated is the 
ratio of 232U contamination to 233U present. It 
could not be determined because the pebble 
fuels do not use 233U as fissile material. 
The second indicator is material 
quantity that indicate number (in quantity or 
element mass) needed to reach one 
significant quantity (SQ). A significant quantity 
is the amount of nuclear material that can fulfil 
the needs of manufacturing a nuclear 
explosive device[10]. The 10-MWt RDE has 
27,000 fuel pebbles in one reactor. Each 
pebble weighs 200 grams with 5 grams of 
uranium[10]. One SQ for indirect use low 
enriched uranium (235U< 20%) is 75 kg[10].  
Mass of an item indicates the 
difficulties in diversion of material. The lighter 
the mass of an item the easier to diverse the 
item. The mass of each fuel pebble is 200 
grams that gave the score of weakest 
proliferation resistance. Although the 
proliferation resistance in nuclear fuel weight 
is weak, the proliferation resistance from 
number to reach 1 SQ is strong. The more 
mass or number of items needed for 1 SQ, the 
harder it is to proliferate that nuclear material. 
Equation 1 shows the calculation for mass of 
bulk material needed for 1 SQ, while Equation 
2 shows the calculation for number of items 
needed to reach 1 SQ. According to the 
calculation from equation 1, total pebble mass 
for 1 SQ is 3000 kg indicating very strong 
proliferation resistance. Number of items also 
shows 15,000 pebbles are needed to reach 1 
SQ that indicates very strong proliferation 
resistance. 
The last evaluation parameter in this 
indicator is the number of SQ in one process 
or stage. As we know from the result before, 
the number of fuel pebbles to reach 1 SQ is 
15,000 while the number of fuel pebbles in 
the reactor is 27,000. By dividing the total 
number of pebbles in one reactor by number 
of pebbles needed for SQ, we get the result 
that the 10-MWt RDE core has a total of 1.8 
SQ of uranium.  This number indicates a 
strong proliferation resistance because the 
reactor has only slightly less than 2 SQ if it 
were to be used for harmful purposes.  
The third indicator is material 
classification. Physical and chemical 
properties of a material affect the difficulty to 
extract the nuclear material for harmful 
purposes. The TRISO fuel pebble is 
categorized as compound because uranium 
inside the fuel is mixed with graphite and 
other support material making it difficult to 
extract [11]. The result of evaluation indicates 
that the pebble fuel has medium proliferation 
resistance due to the difficultness in 
extracting the nuclear material. 
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Table 2. General Evaluation Results of UR 2: Attractiveness of Nuclear Material and Technology 
Indicators No 
Evaluation 
Parameter 
Evaluation Scale 
VW W M S VS 
Material 
Quality 
1 Material Type UDU IDU LEU √ NU DU 
2 239Pu/Pu (%Wt)  >50  <50  
3 
232Ucontam for 
233U (ppm) 
<400 400-1000 1000-2500 2500-25000 >25000 
4 
Dose (mGy/hr) at 
1 m 
<150 150–350 350–1000 1000-10000 >10000 
5 238Pu/Pu (%wt)  <20  >20  
6 
(240Pu+242Pu)/Pu 
(%wt) 
     
Material 
Quantity 
7 
Mass of an item 
(kg) 
>10 
(200g) 
10–100 100–500 500–1000 >1000 
8 
Mass of bulk 
material for SQ 
(kg) 
10 10–100 100-500 500–1000 
>1000 
(3000) 
9 
No. of items for 
SQ 
1 1-10 10–50 50–100 
>100 
(15000) 
10 
No. of SQs 
(material stock or 
flow) 
>100 50–100 10-50 1–10 (1,8) <1 
Material 
Classification 
11 
Chemical/physical 
form 
Metal Oxide 
Com-
pounds √ 
Spent Fuel Waste 
Nuclear 
Technology 
12 Enrichment  Yes  No √  
13 
Extraction of 
fissile material 
 Yes  No √  
14 
Irradiation 
capability of 
undeclared fertile 
material 
 Yes  No √  
*Unevaluated parameter is colored in red while selected scale in a parameter is colored in green 
 The final indicator of UR 2 is nuclear 
technology. According to engineering design, 
none of those features are available in the 10-
MWt RDE. The 10 MWt RDE is only a reactor 
facility planned without any sample irradiation 
facility. RDE also have semi-automatic fuel 
handling system that makes the reactor can 
only accept pebble fuel with corresponding 
sphericity. The fuel for 10-MWt RDE will be 
imported, and the enrichment will be done by 
the manufacturer so there is no enrichment 
facility inside the reactor. RDE is also not 
designed with post irradiation examination 
lab or facility.  
The evaluation of UR 2 gave results 
of one parameter with very weak resistance, 
two parameters with medium resistance, four 
parameters with strong resistance, and two 
parameters with very strong resistance. The 
total score of UR 2 is 33 with nine parameters 
evaluated and five parameters unevaluated. 
The average score of UR 2 is 3.6 or rounded 
to 4 that indicates that the proliferation 
resistance seen from the attractiveness of 
nuclear material and technology is strong. 
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Evaluation of UR 3 Diversion and 
Detectability of Nuclear Material. 
Evaluation of UR 3 was done using a 
total of 13 evaluation parameters. The 
parameters are divided in five indicators as 
can be seen in Table 3. Every evaluation 
parameter and indicator will be evaluated 
with the data of basic engineering design and 
data from reactor that already established in 
Indonesia. The established reactor data can 
also be used even if the reactor is not the 
same type as RDE. The established reactor 
data will be used as reference of reactor 
operation and amendability of safeguards 
system implemented in established reactors. 
Table 3 shows the evaluation of UR 3. 
The accountability indicator mean that 
every nuclear material present must be 
accounted. The total MUF to SQ ratio show 
how much nuclear material can be lost 
(unaccounted) compared to number of SQ. 
The 10-MWt RDE is analyzed to be bulk 
facility, but the characteristic of pebble that 
contain nuclear material can avoid MUF in 
process or handling system [12]. The unique 
characteristic of pebble fuel and RDE facility 
make the facility is declared as bulk facility with 
expected zero MUF from the process. The 
expected MUF can come from measurement 
uncertainty in each KMP. Approximately, 
number of MUF can be close to the amount of 
uncertainty of any measurement tool used in 
the facility [13]. Evaluation parameter of total 
MUF to SQ ratio is scored very high with the 
value of 0.1 meaning there are less than 0.1 
SQ of total MUF that is expected to occur in 
the facility. The value of MUF is acquired from 
the refrence of similar reactor [13] and 
International Target Values (ITV) for 
measurement in safeguards application [14] 
The inspector measurement 
capability parameter of this indicator evaluates 
the way inspector can measure the nuclear 
material inside the facility. Each Fresh pebble 
nuclear fuel has thousands of TRISO particle 
around the 6 cm pebble fuel [2]. The well 
distributed TRISO particle has uranium and its 
decay daughter inside which can expose 
gamma radiation that enables Non-
Destructive Analysis. Therefore, the NDA 
passive can be applied to analyze pebble fuel. 
This parameter is evaluated by knowledge the 
inspector can get from the inspection that 
affect chance of nuclear material diversion. 
The NDA passive ease of measurement are 
better than item counting and NDA active. 
These advantages of NDA passive analysis 
gave very strong proliferation resistance. 
 The second indicator is amenability of 
containment and surveillance (C/S) system 
and other monitoring system. This indicator 
means that the facility must have a proper 
system that can answer the need of nuclear 
material containment and surveillance. The 
need of C/S system is the continuation of 
knowledge in the amount and place of nuclear 
material. The containment system serves as a 
way to keep nuclear material in a place where 
it should be ensuring there are no diversion 
happen. The surveillance system serves as a 
way for authority (state or international level) 
to have the knowledge of the activity that 
happen around or related to the nuclear 
material. The monitoring system serve as a 
support system of both the containment and 
surveillance. This indicator with three 
parameters is evaluated by comparing the 
history of three nuclear reactor that already 
established. All of Indonesia’s research 
reactors have already established an 
amendable C/S system. One of the examples 
for the success in C/S system implementation 
is in Indonesia Multipurpose Reactor G.A 
Siwabessy [15]. The amenability is proven by 
both state and international authorities to 
Indonesian National Nuclear Energy Agency 
(BATAN). The past experience got from other 
installations ensures that C/S system also 
other monitoring system that will be equipped 
in RDE will be amendable. 
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Table 3. General Evaluation Results of UR3: Diversion and Detectability of Nuclear Material 
Indicators No 
Evaluation 
Parameter 
Evaluation Scale 
VW W M S VS 
Accountability 
1 σMUF/SQ > 2 2~1 1~0.5 0.5~0.1 < 0.1 
2 
Inspectors’ 
measurement 
capability 
IC only DA only 
DA 
and 
NDA 
NDA Active 
NDA 
Passive 
Amenability for 
C/S and- 
-monitoring 
systems 
3 
Amenability of 
containment 
measures 
 No  Yes  
4 
Amenability of 
surveillance 
measures 
 No  Yes  
5 
Amenability of 
other monitoring 
systems 
 No  Yes  
Detectability of 
nuclear 
material 
6 
Possibility to 
identify nuclear 
material by NDA 
 No  Yes  
7 
Detectability of 
radiation signature 
 No  Yes  
Difficulty to 
modify the 
process 
8 
Extent of 
automation 
N/A 
Manual 
Automation 
N/A 
Partial 
Automation 
Full 
Automation 
9 
Availability of data 
for inspectors 
Operator 
Data 
   NRTA 
10 
Transparency of 
process 
 No  Yes  
11 
Accessibility of 
material to 
inspectors 
 No  Yes  
Difficulty to 
modify facility 
design 
12 
Verifiability of 
facility design by 
inspectors 
 No  Yes  
Detectability of 
misuse of 
technology or 
facilities. 
13 
Possibility to detect 
misuse of the 
technologies and 
the INS facilities for 
processing of 
undeclared nuclear 
material. 
 No  Yes  
*Unevaluated parameter is colored in red while selected scale in a parameter is colored in green 
 The third indicator is detectability of 
nuclear material. This indicator has two 
parameters: the possibility of detection by 
NDA and detection of radiation signature.. 
According to the safeguards system of 10-
MWt RDE, the fuel used in the RDE have an 
initial enrichment of 17%. The 17% enrichment 
of 235U emits gamma radiation of specific 
energy which can be both detected by NDA 
and give specific radiation signature. This 
Urania 
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detectability by NDA and specific radiation 
signature gave high proliferation resistance to 
the facility, specifically seen in detectability 
point of view. 
The fourth indicator is difficulty to 
modify the process. There are two kinds of 
HTGR currently being developed: the first one 
is HTGR with fuel recycle system and the 
second one is HTGR with Once Trough Then 
Out (OTTO) system[16]. Both HTGR use 
automatic loading-unloading features where 
pebbles will be automatically fed to the reactor 
core and automatically unloaded after a 
specific period of time [16]. Once the pebble 
fuel was fed into the fuel recycle line, it will 
automatically be recycled. The circuit of the 
fuel ends after the fuel goes around the reactor 
for about 10 times. The spent fuel will also be 
automatically sent to the spent fuel storage. 
The spent fuel will be placed inside a storage 
canister and the canister will be placed in dry 
storage. This fuel cycle system is categorized 
as partial automation because the human or 
worker still interact with the fuel when feeding 
the fuel to the fuel line and in locking the spent 
fuel storage canister. The partial automation 
gave high proliferation resistance because it 
makes human difficult to modify the process or 
to diverse the nuclear material mid-process. 
 The second parameter in the fourth 
indicator is data availability for inspector. 
There are only two scales of this parameter: 
one is operator data that scaled very weak and 
the other is NRTA that scored very strong. 
NRTA stands for Near Real Time Accountancy 
where the inspector equips set of instruments 
in each KMP. This instrument will give the 
nuclear material accountancy data such as 
weight, and place in real time to the inspector 
in IAEA or state level. The NRTA system is not 
yet established in Indonesia. Therefore, 
making the RDE will only have operator data 
available for the inspector. The operator data 
make the 10-MWt RDE have very weak 
proliferation resistance because the data can 
be inaccurate or changed before the inspector 
see the data. 
 The third and fourth parameters of this 
indicator are transparency of the process and 
accessibility of material to inspector. This 
indicator evaluation depends on the 
willingness of the operator/state to 
demonstrate its level of transparency[17]. 
According to Indonesia’s experience in doing 
the safeguards system, operator and state 
have a high level of transparency. Operator is 
willing to give all the information that inspector 
needs and state obliges the facility to follow 
every instruction to fulfil the safeguards 
agreement. This parameter gave high 
proliferation resistance due to Indonesia’s 
experience in implementing the integrated 
safeguards agreement. 
 The fifth parameter is verifiability of 
design to inspector. The design verifiability 
parameter is evaluated in the same manner as 
the accessibility of material before. The 
willingness of operator/state to give 
information about the facility is an important 
factor in design verifiability. Design verifiability 
also affected by state commitment in 
implementing integrated safeguard 
agreement. According to Information Circular 
Number 288 Add 1 [18], Indonesia as a state 
has committed to accept any kind of inspection 
related to implementing integrated 
safeguards. One of the inspections is 
Complementary Access (CA) done by IAEA. 
One of the goals of the CA inspection is to 
verify correctness of information in the 
Additional Protocol declaration done by each 
facility. The state commitment and facility 
willingness make this parameter scored high 
proliferation resistance. 
 The last parameter of UR 3 is 
possibility to detect misuse of the technologies 
and the INS facilities for processing of 
undeclared nuclear material. The IAEA will 
likely use numbers of instrument such as fuel 
flow monitor to verify fuel transfer [19]. The 
flow monitor will help both operator and 
inspector to count, verify, and distinguish 
different types of pebbles such as fresh fuel 
and spent fuel pebble. The measurement 
done by flow monitor can be one of many 
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methods to detect misuse of technology. 
Passive NDA such as multi-channel analyser 
spectrometer coupled in the flow monitor can 
also help differentiate pebble’s content. The 
ability to acquire such information give this 
parameter a high proliferation resistance. 
 The evaluation of UR 3 gave one 
parameter with very weak proliferation 
resistance, ten parameters with strong 
proliferation resistance, and two parameter 
with very high proliferation resistance. Total 
score of UR 3 is 51 with 13 parameters all 
evaluated. The average score of UR 3 is 3.9 or 
rounded to 4 indicates that the 10-MWt RDE 
has a strong proliferation resistance seen from 
Diversion and Detectability of Nuclear Material 
requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
The 10-MWt RDE has strong 
proliferation resistance evaluated in terms of 
attractiveness of nuclear material and 
technology. The weakest parameter in this UR 
is the mass of each item. The pebble for RDE’s 
fuel has a mass of 200 grams. This lightweight 
item can be easily taken under weak 
supervision. While the weakest parameter is 
the mass of item, the strongest parameter in 
this UR is mass of bulk material and number 
of items needed for SQ. The mass of bulk 
material needed for the uranium inside the fuel 
to reach SQ is 3000 kg. This number indicates 
that an enormous mass is needed which 
makes the diversion harder and take longer 
time to fulfil the enormous mass of uranium 
needed. The number of pebbles needed to 
reach SQ is 15,000. This high amount of 
pebbles needed makes diversion easier to 
detect, therefore it strengthens the resistance 
of proliferation inside the facility. The 10-MWt 
RDE has strong proliferation resistance 
evaluated in terms of diversion and 
detectability of nuclear material. The weakest 
parameter in this UR is the available data for 
inspector. The strongest parameter in UR 3 is 
the ratio between MUF to SQ. MUF in RDE will 
only present as uncertainty of data due to the 
characteristic of process and nuclear material. 
Further assessment in proliferation resistance 
and calculation of MUF are needed for RDE 
safeguards system to be comprehensively 
amendable. Wholesome knowledge about the 
sustainability of RDE and design improvement 
can be acquired by doing full INPRO 
assessment in proliferation resistance and 
other important areas such as economics and 
waste treatment.  
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